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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LA,V"SON SUPPLY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
GENERAL
&
HEATING, INC., a corporation,
E. KEITH LIGNELL and
BURTON M. TODD,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
12362

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by a materialman to a
subcontractor against the owners of an improvement
under the mechanic's lien law and contractor's bonding
law of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LO,V-ER COURT
Trial of the matter was held on September 2, 1970,
before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde sitting without
1

a jury. The Decree of the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, entered on November 2, 1970, declared the mechanic's lien claimed by plaintiff to be null
and void, but awarded judgment against defendants E.
Keith Lignell and Burton M. Todd in the amount of
$8,200.20, together with interest and costs, under provisions of the contractor's bonding law. Defendants' Motion to Tax Costs and Motion to Amend Findings of
Fact were denied on December 7, 1970.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants E. Keith Lignell and Burton M. Todd
seek a reversal of the judgment Decree and a reversal
of the Order Denying Motion to Tax Costs, Awarding
Costs as Filed and Overruling Objections to Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

STATEMENT OF .FACTS
Defendants E. Keith Lignell and Burton M. Todd
entered into an agreement with Clifford Berg to construct an apartment complex on property owned by the
former at 247 South 7th East, Salt Lake City, Utah.
The contract, dated April 24, 1968, was in writing. No
bond was required of Berg as prime contractor ( R. 116).
Subsequently, Berg entered into a plumbing subcontract with General Plumbing & Heating, Inc. (R.
212).
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General Plumbing & Heating, Inc. purchased materials which were incorporated into the project from at
least three different suppliers (R. 213, 210). Among
these suppliers of plumbing fixtures was plaintiff Lawson Supply Company.
Lawson had supplied plumbing fixtures to General
Plumbing for some 20 years (R. 161, 172). During this
entire period Lawson had maintained a general open account of its dealings with General Plumbing ( R. 160,
163). :Materials incorporated into the Lignell and Todd
apartment complex were purchased upon open account
(R. 163) by General Plumbing from Lawson beginning
with the invoice dated July 12, 1968 (Ex. P-12). The
concluding invoice, except for minor replacements and
repairs, was dated May 15, 1969 (Ex. P-12, R. 146,
203). Lawson and General Plumbing transacted this
business by way of individual sales orders (R. 174); the
parties had no contract for the specific job in its entireity ( R. 17 4). Although some big jobs had, in the
past, been set up under a special account (R. 162-164),
all transactions with General Plumbing were handled
on open and general account (R. 160, 163).
Some materials were delivered to the job site by
Lawson, but other materials were picked up by General
Plumbing from Lawson's warehouse (R. 151, 160).
Information recorded on sales orders was transferred to invoices (R. 150), and ultimately to a ledger
(Ex. P-5, R. 156). The ledger contained a chronological
listing of all invoices on sales between Lawson and Gen-
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eral Plumbing regardless of the project into which the
materials were incorporated ( R. 156). The ledger was
used in billing General Plumbing and in determining
which invoices to charge against defendants Lignell and
Todd ( R. 155). Payments were credited against the
oldest unpaid invoice without regard to a specific job
(R. 164, 169). In other words, the general account was
credited without regard to the source of the payment
(R. 169).
By reference to the ledger, Lawson sorted out invoices totaling $13,981.85 as representing materials incorporated into the Lignell and Todd apartment complex (Ex. P-5). Payments over this same period totaled
$7,688.48 (Ex. P-5).

By applying all payments to the oldest indebtedness, as shown on the general ledger, regardless of where
the materials were used and by sorting out invoices,
Lawson arrived at the date of January 15, 1969, as the
date from which subsequent charges remained unpaid
(R. 146, 165, 186). Subsequent charges which Lawson
identified with the Lignell and Todd apartment complex totaled $8,200.20 (R. 154, 185). Payments of
$3,000.00 and $858.16, made on February 25, 1969 and
June 16, 1969, respectively, were credited against invoices dated prior to January 15, 1969 (R. 158, 195).
Suit was commenced claiming the furnishing of
materials between January 15, 1969 and August 1, 1969
with a reasonable value of $8,200.20 (R. 2-4).
Lawson had no dealings whatsoever with the own-
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ers, Lignell and Todd (R. 124); in fact, the owners did
not even know Lawson to be a supplier (R. 124). Similarly, the prime contractor, Berg, had no dealings or
contractual relationship with Lawson (R. 212, 217).
The plumbing subcontractor, General Plumbing,
was paid in full by Berg (R. 213).
ARGUMENT

I.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT A MATERIALl\IAN
"\VITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953, SECTIONS 14-2-1 AND 14-

2-2.

The applicable section of the Utah Contractor's
Bonding Law, Section 14-2-2, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, reads as follows:
"Any person subject to the provisions of this
chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and
sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein
required, shall be personally liable to all persons
who have furnished materials or performed labor
under the contract for the reasonable value of
such materials furnished or labor performed, not
exceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed
upon. Actions to recover on such liability shall be
commenced within one year for the last date the
last materials were furnished or the labor performed."
That section was construed by this Court in the case
of Crown Roofing and Engineering Co. v. Robinson, 19

5

U 2d 417, 432 P.2d 47 (1967). In that case it was held
that the plaintiff was not a person furnishing materials
"under the contract" entered into for the construction
of a home.
The facts of the Crown Roofing case are nearly
identical to those of the instant case. In both cases the
plaintiffs are suppliers to a building subcontractor. In
both cases the owners are not in privity with the !)upplierplaintiff, and in both cases some party stands to pay the
same bill twice. In Crown the supplier had had business
dealings with the roofing subcontractor for a period of
five or six years. In this case the supplier-plaintiff had
had business dealings with the plumbing subcontractor
for a period of 20 years (R. 161and172). In Crown the
supplier-plaintiff had maintained an open account with
the subcontractor for at least two years prior to the commencement of the contracts involved in that case. In this
case the supplier-plaintiff had maintained an open account with the subcontractor for the entire twenty year
period of their business dealings (R. 160 and 163). In
Crown payments were credited to the general account
and never to the individual job. In the instant case payments were similarly credited to the general account
without regard to the specific job (R. 169). In Crown
there was no evidence that the supplier was furnishing
the material under any specific contract for the construction of a home. In this case the plaintiff, through its secretary-treasurer, admitted that it had no contract with
General Plumbing for the specific job in its entirety (R.
17 4) . In Crown some shingles were delivered directly to
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the job site. In this case some materials were delivered
lo the job site by Lawson, but other materials were
picked up by General Plumbing from Lawson's warehouse (R. 151 and 160). In Crown payments were applied to discharge the oldest indebtedness without regard
to where the materials were used. In the instant case
payments were similarly credited against the oldest unpaid invoice without regard to a specific job ( R. 164).
In both cases the ledgers showed that the subcontractors
were purchasing supplies from plaintiffs for use on other
jobs (R. 155).
In Crown this Court concluded that the plaintiff
had extended credit to the subcontractor and not to the
contract job. This Court held that the plaintiff was not
a person furnishing the materials under the contract
entered into for the construction of a home.
The Crown case cites as support the earlier Utah
case of Crane Co. v. Utah Motor Park, Inc., 8 U. 2d
413, 335 P. 2d 837 ( 1959). The latter case in turn is supported by Harris & Stunston, Inc. v. Yorba Linda
Citrus Ass'n., 135 Cal. App. 154, 26 P. 2d 654 (1933).
These cited cases are consitent with the general rule
as stated in 53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanic's Liens, Sec. 101.
The view expressed in that section has obviously not
been rejected in this jurisdiction, but has been followed
as is obvious from the Crown case.
"Statutes which permit a lien for materials furnished usually apply only to a furnishing for
building purposes, and do not include a furnish-

7

ing for ge.neral or unknown purposes, or an ordinary sale m the usual course of trade or on a general open account, or a sale without any reference
as to what shall be done with the material sold.
Additionally, the materials must have been furnished on the credit of tJhe building, and not merely on the general and personal credit of the owner,
contractor, or some other person. The mechanic's
lien law contemplates a contract or agreement
more specific that an ordinary sale of materials;
it should be understood between the parties that
the materials are to be used in the erection or repair of a building or the making of an improvement. If' a materialman sells his materials without any understandings as to their application, he
can assert no lien upon the building upon which
they may be used, since he relies exclusively upon
the credit of the buyer and takes no security. The
lien is acquired, therefore, only when the materials are furnished with an understanding, that
they are to be used for a purpose named in the
statute, and not when they are supplied under an
ordinary sale on credit or on open account, although the buyer may actually use them in a
building or improvement. However, this view is
rejected in some jurisdictions as not comporting
with a liberal view to effectuate the purpose of
the statute to secure recovery by the materialman." (Emphasis added)
The rule as quoted above and as stated in the Crown
case, requires the materials to have been furnished on
the credit of a building and not merely on the general or
personal credit of the purchaser. A person extending
credit to the contract job would be exemplified by a subcontractor sharing progress payments and relying upon
those specific job payments from his contractor. On the
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contrary, a subcontractor or supplier who keeps an open
account and who make.s monthly or periodic billings
without regard to progress payments from a particular
job would not be a materialman within Section 14-2-2.
The trial brought forth absolutely no testimony that
Lawson expected to wait for construction progress payments or until completion of the job. In fact, Lawson
billed General Plumbing on a monthly basis without regard to any particular job or the progress payments
from that job (Ex. P-5).
The quotation from Am. J ur. 2d also recites that a
supplier is not entitled to the benefit of a mechanic's lien
statute when the materials are furnished in an ordinary
sale in the usual course of trade or on a general open account. The evidence in this case is overwhelming to the
effect that plaintiff furnished supplies to General
Plumbing on a general open account.
"Q. (By Mr. Tibbals) Mr. McElroy, had Lawson Supply done business with General Plumbing and Heating
prior to the Globe Investment Job?

A. Yes, they have.

Q. And did you have a general account with General
Plumbing and Heating?
A. Yes, we did." ( R. 160)

* * * * *

"Q. 'V ell, sometimes you set up special accounts; don't
you, for big jobs?
9

A. What do you mean by special accounts?

Q. You itemize that particular job and prepare a ledger

for that particular job, and credit every payment that
comes in from that job to that special ledger?

A. It has been done if _so required by our customers.

Q. If it is not required, I take it you have not done it,
you just had a general open account?
A. We had an account receivable.
Q. It was an open account; wasn't it?

A. Yes.
Q. It is an open account?

A. So were the other ones open accounts.
Q. I am just asking on this one. It has always been an
open account; hasn't it?

A. That is correct.
Q. For 20 years it has been an open account; hasn't it?

A. That is also correct." (R. 162-163)
Notwithstanding the abundant testimony by plaintiff's own witness, the trial court found, in Finding No.
19, that "the materials so supplied were not delivered to
General Plumbing and Heating, Inc. on open account,
* * *" (R. 97). Such a finding of fact is not supported
by the testimony, which testimony was adduced by plaintiff. Furthermore, such a finding is prejudicial and materially affects appellants' right to prevail under the applicable law.
10

ln determining whether an account is an open account and whether a supplier is a materialman, the application of payments has been considered as an important factor. In Crown Roofing
Engineering Co. v.
Robinson, cited supra, this Court referred to the account
as an open account and noted (page 421), that "* * *
when payments were made, plaintiff credited them to
the general account and never to the individual job" and
that "when the contractor made a payment it was applied
to discharging the
indebtedness without regard as
to where the materials were used." Similarly, in Western Electric Co., Inc. v. Iowa Falls Electric Co., 196
Iowa 19, 193 N.W. 556 (1923) and Layrite Products
Co. v. Lux, 91 Idaho 110, 416 P. 2d 501 (1966), the
respective courts specifically noted that there were no
attempts to credit payments to any particular job. In
the former case the court stated (page 557) that "Whenever payments were received by plaintiff from Kaul, no
attempt was made to credit the payments so received on
any particular job; no inquiry was made as to the source
of the money, but Kaul's general account was given
credit." In both cases the accounts were held to be general open accounts, and in both cases the plaintiffs were
denied status as materialmen.
In the Layrite case the Idaho Supreme Court held
that the supplier had no lien because it had sold on an
open running account and on the general credit of the
contractor. This the court held notwithstanding the argument of the supplier that the materials sold and later
used in the building were sold with reference to the par11

ticular job. The supplier maintained that invoices plainly stated the house job number or job designation and
the building maconclusively showed that Layrite
terials for use in defendant's home and upon the security
of the defendant's home.
The arbitrary method by which plaintiff computed
its claim against defendants Lignell and Todd points
out the reason and logic behind this Court's decision in
Crown Roofing and Engineering Co. v. Robinson, cited
supra. It al.so points out the reason why the mere notation of a job location on invoices without a corresponding application of payments to that job does not produce
a fair and equitable result. The plaintiff here claimed
that Lignell and Todd should pay for materials furnished after January 15, 1969, in the amount of $8,200.20. However, during the same period covered by plaintiff's Complaint, General Plumbing made two payments
totaling $3,858.16 (R. 195 and 196). If these payments
were credited to the Lignell and Todd job for that same
period of time, the balance would be $4,342.04. Instead,
they were credited to discharge the oldest indebtedness,
and, in fact, were credited against invoices dated prior
to January 15, 1969 (R. 158 and 195). As an alternative,
Lawson could theoretically have applied all payments
made by General Plumbing to the charges Lawson associates with the Lignell and Todd job over its duration.
Since Lawson sorted out invoices totaling $13,981.85 as
representing materials incorporated into the Lignell and
Todd apartment complex (Ex. P-5), and since payments over this same time period totaled $7,688.48 (Ex.
12

PI5), this method would have left a balance of only
;jili,:293.37. The reason for the requirement that credit be
extended to the job and not merely upon open account
to the subcontractor is evident from this advantage
which accrues to suppliers by permitting an artificial
segregation of accounts and particularly an artificial
segregation of payments. In fairness, Lawson should not
be permitted to comingle accounts and then arbitrarily
segregate them to its own advantage to facilitate its action against the owners.
Again referring back to the quotation from 53 Am.
Jur. :2d, Mechanic's Liens, Section 101, it was stated that
the "mechanic's lien law contemplates a contract or
agreement more specific than an ordinary sale of materials; * * *". This series of transactions was nothing
more than an ordinary sale of materials upon an open
and general account; there was no furnishing of materials "under the contract," as required by Section 142-:2. In this respect the testimony of plaintiff's secretarytreasurer is very enlightening.
Q. You never did get a contract; did you?

A. This term "Contract" evidently had me confused
because now I can see that everyone of these are really
a contract. I mean I thought you were referring to-Of course we never do anyway, but some companies may
have a contract for say this specific job in its entirety,
which we don't have. But the way I interpret this sales
order, everyone of these is a contract.
Q. I see.
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So you are talking about a contract in the sense that
you sold _something and they agreed to buy it; is that
right1

A. Right. I thought you were talking about arrangements. I mean some companies write out a specific contract, say, for this complete job which we, of course,
don't do. (R. 174).
Similarly, plaintiff's secretary-treasurer testified
that he never set up any special ledger for the Lignell
and Todd job (R. 169). However, he did testify that on
certain occasions, particularly on large jobs, special accounts were established whereby payments could be
credited to the specific job:
"Q. Sure.
On some occasions with other jobs you have set up a
special account with a particular sub-contractor for that
particular job, itemizing what the job was, and only including in your ledger those items that went on that particular job; is that true?
A. It has been done if specifically requested by our customer. All it is is additional bookkeeping for us. It has
been done, but ordinarily it would be for a job that
would be many many times bigger than this one.

Q. Sure, maybe what you consider a large job, and that
helps you to know what items have been supplied to that
job?
A. 'Vell it helps them to know better.
14

Q. Well, it also helps you to know what items have been

paid in that job, doesn't iU
A. Right." (R. 163-164)

Policy reasons dictate that the contractor's bonding
law be strictly construed. Recovery by plaintiff against
the owners would amount to the imposition of a statutorYt
penalty since payment to General Plumbing for the
identical supplies has once been made ( R. 213). :Furtheremore, Lawsn could have protected itself against
the financial embarrassment of General Plumbing by
more carefully selecting its customers; whereas Lignell
and Todd had no privity or dealings with the plumbing
subcontractor, General Plumbing. Similarly, Lawson
had no dealings whatsoever with the owners and, in fact,
the owners did not even know Lawson to be the supplier
(R. 124). Under such circumstances where the supplierplaintiff is several tiers removed from the owners, it becomes difficult for the owners to adequately protect their
interests. Consequently, the contractor's bonding statute
should be strictly construed to require a plaintiff to come
within its narrow terms when claiming against a party
having no contractual privity and, in fact, not knowing
of the plaintiff's position as a prospective claimant. This
becomes particularly significant since the Utah Statute
does not require a supplier to give notice of his intention
to supply materials as do many other statutes.
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II.
TI-IE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLO\V1.N GAS COSTS TIIE EXPENSES INCURRED
BY PLAINTIFF IN THE TAKING OF DEPOSITIONS.
AN otice of Taking Depositions of owners Lignell
and Todd and prime contractor Berg was filed by plaintiff ( R. 37) . Berg, not being a party to the action, was
served with a subpoena ( R. 40) . At trial Lignell testified on his own behalf and it was stipulated that the testimony of Todd would be the same as that of Lignell.
Berg was called to testify first by the plaintiff and later
by appellants. The deposition of Lignell was used once
in cross-examination ( R. 131) ; however, the depositions
of Todd and Berg were not used in any respect at the
triP 1.
Plaintiff's :Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements included the fee of a certified shorthand reporter
in connection with these three depositions, together with
the witness fee and mileage of Berg (R. 107). Objection was timely made by these appellants in their Motion to Tax Costs and Motion to Amend Findings of
l'-,act (R. 72).
The issue here presented as to the inclusion of deposition expenses as costs of court has apparently been before this Court on only two earlier occasions. In Thomas
v. Childrens Aid Society of Ogden, 12 U. 2d 235, 364 P.
2d 1029 ( 1961), this Court, in one brief paragraph, held
16

that expenses incurred in the taking of those depositions
should be allowed. No recitation was made in that case
as to whether the witnesses testified at trial or as to the
uses made of the depositions. In the earlier case of Hull
v. Goodman, 4 U. 2d 162, 290 P. 2d 245 (1955), this
Court discussed in greater detail the facts behind its ruling that the expenses incurred in taking three depositions should not be included as costs. In that case this
Court recited that all three of the witnesses testified at
trial, two witnesses being called by the respondents and
the third witness being called by the appellants.
Because of the seeming conflict between those two
cases, it is felt that some clarification should be made.
Rule 54 ( d), Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, is not express on this point.
In 6 Moore's Federal Practice, paragraph 54. 77
( 4) , after explaining that the expenses of taking depositions are properly includable as costs if the taking of the
depositions was reasonably necessary, states as follows:
"Part or all of a deposition, depending somewhat
upon its use, is certainly reasonably necessary for
use in the case where it is read into evidence in
connection with some material matter; and may
properly be treated as reasonably necessary, although not read into evidence, when it serves a
real value in connection with cross examination,
but not when its use is rather trivial. * * *
"But just as investigation expenses are not
chargeable as costs, deposition expenses may.not
properly be taxed as costs where the depositions
17

serve essentially that purpose or a kindred purpose of thorough preparation, credible as that obJ ective may be."
It is submitted that, in this case, the three depositions served essentially the pw·pose of preparation. Only
the deposition of Lignell was used at the time of trial,
and the use of that deposition in clarifying a point upuu
cross examination could undoubtedly be classified as
trivial. The three depositions were taken substantially
before the date of trial, and it would surely seem that
they were taken for purpo_ses of investigation and preparation in marshaling of the facts for use by plaintiff at
the trial. In fact, plaintiff's verified Memorandum of
Costs and Disbursements recites that the three depositions were "essential to the plaintff's adequate preparaton for trial. * * *" (R. 108).

CONCLUSION
This Court's
in Crown Roofing Ci; Engineering Co. v. Robinson, 19 U. 2d 417, 432 P. 2d 47
( 1967), was not properly understood by the trial judge.
That case, with its nearly identical facts, should be controlling here. The evidence here is abundant that plaintiffs supplied materials for various jobs in a series of ordinary sales in the usual course of trade and on a general
open account. The contractor's bonding law contemplates a contract or an agreement more specific than the
ordinary sale of materials. It contemplates the furnishing of supplies "under the contract."
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The inclusion in the Findings of Fact of a finding
that the materials were "not delivered** *on open ac('ount," was merely an attempt to skirt the holding of the
Crown case. Such a finding of fact is contrary to the
testimony of
own witness and is prejudicial
and reversible error.
Respectfully submitted,
WILFORD A. BEESLEY and
ORVAL C. HARRISON
15 East 4th South

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
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